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WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO SETTLE BY A LIABILITY INSURER:
THE STANDARD FOR ILLINOIS
Modern casualty insurance policies not only provide for indemnity pay-
ments to the insured, but also obligate the company to defend the insured in
court' and, further, make it a violation of the policy conditions, which could
give the insurer the right to deny coverage, if the insured injects himself into
negotiations with the claimant. 2 The insured has in effect bartered away his
rights to determine the facts and can no longer protect himself from the possibil-
ity of a large award of damages against him. It is also true that the insuring
party can be held liable to the insured for a judgment in excess of the limits of
the policy of insurance.3
When the possibility of a judgment in excess of policy limits exists, the
insurer has a duty to consider the interests of the insured in negotiations for
an out of court settlement. 4 While the insurance policy does not necessarily
obligate an insurer to compromise a claim, it leaves the negotiations and the
conduct of the defense up to the insurer, who must deal fairly in all respects
with the insured.5 The purpose of this note is to analyze "wrongful refusal to
settle" in Illinois and to suggest that a higher standard of care should be imposed
on an insurer in making the decision to refuse an out of court settlement which
is within the limits of the stipulated insurance.
The law in other jurisdictions dealing with the appropriate standard of
care varies. Some states apply the bad faith standard, 6 while others use the
1 For example, the following is an excerpt from the standard auto insurance policy
of the National Ben Franklin of Illinois Insurance Company:
[Tihe company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or prop-
erty damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this policy,
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; but
the company may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient.
2 A typical example of such a clause is the following which is taken from the standard
auto insurance policy of the National Ben Franklin of Illinois Insurance Company:
The insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment,
assume any obligation or incur any expense other than for such immediate medical
and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of accident.
3 Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 60 Ill. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d
198 (1966) ; Cowden v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 233 (1957) ;
Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Communale v. Traders General
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1963). See Keeton, Liability Ins. & Responsibility lor
Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1136 (1954).
4 Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649, 60
N.E.2d 895 (1945).
5 Wolfberg v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Co. of Chicago, 98 Ill. App. 2d. 190, 240
N.E.2d 176 (1968).
6 Communale v. Traders General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958);
Hilleker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), rehearing held
to clarify the duty of the insured in negotiating a settlement, 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413
(1931); Hart v. Republic Mutual Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 185, 87 N.E.2d 347 (1949);
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negligence standard. 7 The bad faith standard has grown out of the theory that
the action brought by the insurer is for breach of the contract of insurance.8
While there is no express provision in the contract of insurance stating that the
parties will act toward each other in good faith, such a promise may be implied.9
This duty is implied as a correlative of certain rights and privileges that the
contract of insurance confers upon the insurer, i.e., the exclusive right to control
the defense of the insured. 10 This promise appears to be what Williston would
call a .'promise implied in fact."'"
The negligence standard of care has grown out of the theory that the cause
of action is one in tort.'2 The tort cause of action comes about because the
insurer has a duty to the insured arising from the contract of insurance to use
ordinary care in protecting the insured, and a breach thereof causing damages
gives rise to an action ex delicto.13 The Restatement calls this "The Negligent Per-
formance of an Undertaking to Render Services."
One who undertakes gratuitously or for consideration to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the pro-
tection of the others person or things is subject to liability to the other
for physical harm resulting from the failure to exercise reasonable care
to perform his undertaking.
a. if his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm.14
The Restatement further defines undertaking:
In the ordinary case, the undertaking of one who renders services
in the practice of a profession or trade is a matter of contract between
the parties and the terms of the undertaking are either stated expressly
or implied as a matter of understanding. 15
Wakefield v. Globe Indemnity Co., 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929) ; Cowden v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459, 134 A.2d 223 (1957). (Among the states that use the
bad faith rule there are differences as to what amounts to bad faith).
7 Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm. App.
1929) ; Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947). See
Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, 270 Ala 119, 116 So. 2d 924
(1959); Cuygasten v. General Accident, Fire and Life Ins. Corp., 283 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.
1960).
8 See Hilleker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930),
rehearing held to clarify the duty of the insured in negotiating a settlement, 204 Wis. 12,
235 N.W. 413 (1931) ; Georgia Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932); Farmers
General Co. v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 186 Miss. 747, 191 So. 415 (1939); Johnson
v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 A. 788 (1936).
9 Harris v. Standard Accident & Ins. Co., 191 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Best
Building Co. v. Employers Liability Ins. Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928).
10 Hilleker v. Western Automobile Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), rehear-
ing held to clarify the duty of the insured in negotiating a settlement, 204 Wis. 12, 235
N.W. 413 (1931).
11 6 Williston on Contracts, § 887 (3d ed. Jaeger i962).
12 See Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947);
Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
1a Came v. Maryland Casualty Co., 208 Tenn. 406, 346 S.W.2d 261 (1961).
14 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965).
15 Id.
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The insured has parted with his right to defend himself in regard to his
liability to a claimant by the terms of the insurance contract, and he relies on
the insurer to protect his interest.16 If the insurer is negligent in investigating,
evaluating, or negotiating a claim, he exposes the insured to the possibility of
great financial loss in an excess judgment at trial.
Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. 17 was the first
case decided in Illinois involving an action by the insured party against the
insurer for an excess judgment. This case held that an insurer could not be held
liable for a judgment in excess of the limits of insurance "absent a showing of
fraud, negligence, or bad faith."' 8 The court cited several sources which held
that the insurer's duty to the insured arose out of the contract, and then applied
the bad faith standard. But the holding did not completely eliminate application
of the tort theory. The holding in Olympia required good faith of an insurer in
the decision to refuse settlement, but also required ordinary care in conducting
the investigation leading to this decision. This left Illinois with a dual standard
of care and caused some confusion as to whether the action was ex contractu or
ex delicto. This confusion was reflected in two cases, Yelm v. Country Mutual
Ins. Co.19 and in Powell v. Prudence Insurance Company of Chicago,2 0 both of
which managed to settle the issue in chief without answering the question of
whether the action was in contract or tort.
Wolfberg v. Prudence Mutual Casualty Company of Chicago2 ' suggests that
Illinois favors the contract theory and the "bad faith" rule. Woljberg was de-
cided after Powell but before Yelms. In Woljberg, the insurer failed to negotiate
the suit against the deceased insured's estate. The claimants had made an offer
of settlement for $17,000. Upon trial, verdicts totaling $55,000 were rendered.
Thereafter execution was issued and served upon the insured's administrator.
16 American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th
Cir. 1932).
17 325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N.E.2d 896 (1945).
18 Id. at 673, 60 N.E.2d at 906.
19 123 Ill. App. 2d 401, 259 N.E.2d 83 (1970). This was an action for damages based
on an insurers alleged negligent failure to settle a claim. The action was commenced by
the judgment creditor of the insured against the insurer, the insured being neither a
party plaintiff, or defendant. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the
case on motion by the insurer for failure to state a cause of action. The court stated in
their holding, "The nature of the duty which forms the basis of the insured's liability appears
to be the most important aspect to be considered." Whether the duty arises from contract
or tort is a question difficult to resolve and usually unnecessary to determine, in the
solution of a particular problem.
20 88 Ill. App. 2d 343, 232 N.E.2d 155 (1964). This was a garnishment action by an
unsatisfied judgment creditor against a liability insurer of a judgment debtor. The plaintiff
sued the insurer for the amount in excess of the policy limit as assignee subrogee, or third
party creditor, beneficiary on the implied covenant of good faith in an insurance contract
between insured and insurer. The defendant's theory was that if there was a claim, it was
one in tort, hence not assignable in Illinois. The court held for the defendant saying that
even if the implied contract theory correctly stated the law, this type of liability could not
be reached by the Illinois Garnishment Act, 3 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 62 § 33 et seq. (1965).
21 98 111. App. 2d 190, 240 N.E.2d 176 (1968).
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It was returned "no funds." Although the estate had not paid the judgment, a
suit for excess judgment was brought against the insurer. The appellee insurance
company defended on the theory that damage is an essential element of a negli-
gence action, and since pecuniary damage was the essence of this negligence
action and no pecuniary damage could be shown, the appellant's suit must fail.
The appellate court reversed the trial court which dismissed the complaint for
failure to allege the essential element of damage. 22 The appellate court cited
authorities approving the bad faith rule and further stated that the action was
one arising out of a "contractual relationship.12 3 This case states that the action
was one of contract, but what the court means by "contractual relationship" is
not clear. The tort duty also arises out of the contractual relationship. Under the
dual standard established in Olympia, it would seem that when the excess judg-
ment resulted from bad faith negotiations, the insured's action should be on the
contract. But, if the judgment resulted from negotiations based on a negligent
investigation of the facts surrounding the injury, the insured's action should
be in tort.
The cases following Olympia suggest that the breach is most likely to occur
during the actual negotiations.2 4 This may be an indication that the bad faith
rule is not the appropriate standard because it is not really a breach of the con-
tract but a failure of the insurer to adequately represent the insured at the settle-
ment negotiations. It is further submitted that the negligence standard is the
appropriate standard and that a "wrongful refusal to settle" should be considered
a tort. The tort theory implementing the negligence standard of care, imposes a
higher duty of an insurer.2 5 The bad faith standard in Illinois states that an
insurer must give as much consideration to the interests of the insured as it does
to its own interests, and any failure to do so is bad faith.28 The bad faith stan-
dard would seem to excuse poor judgment by an insurer in refusing to settle, as
long as the decision is made in good faith. The courts should not tolerate poor
judgment from insurance companies since their function in society is continually
increasing as more and more citizens become dependent on their representation.
The highest possible standard of care should be required of an insurer when
deciding to place the financial future of the insured in the hands of a jury. The
bad faith standard is subjective in that it requires the insured to prove the state
of mind of the employees of the insurer.27 This can be a difficult burden of proof
22 Id.
23 Id. at 198, 240 N.E.2d at 180.
24 See, Yelm v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 123 Ill. App. 2d 401, 259 N.E.2d 83 (1970);
Powell v. Prudence Ins. Co. of Chicago, 88 Ill. App. 2d 343, 232 N.E.2d 155 (1966);
Cernocky v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 60 Ill. App. 2d 196, 216 N.E.2d 198 (1966).
25 Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
1136, 1140 (1954). The author suggests that with skillful advocacy for the insured, the
bad faith rule is practically equivalent to the negligence rule.
26 Ballard v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952).
27 Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 649,
60 N.E.2d 896 (1945).
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to bear, and is another reason why a cause of action in tort is much more ac-
ceptable.
The tort theory gives more protection to the insurance buying public. The
Restatement of Torts set forth the duty of one who undertakes to render services
as follows:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill, one who
undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is
required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar com-
munities.28
This standard of care requires an insurer, who competes for business by adver-
tising his product through mass media to exercise acceptable skill in representing
the insured. This tort standard is, by definition, objective. The decision of the
insurance company to refuse an offer of settlement would have to be the same
decision as would be made by other insurers in good standing in the community.
In addition, expert witnesses would be available to testify on matters dealing
with claims adjusting and supervisory decisions so that the insured can demon-
strate the wrongful conduct of his representatives.
Appleman, in Insurance Law and Practice, sets forth a statement of his
opinion of the insured's duty to defend:
It has more than the duty of care of an ordinary man unskilled
in litigation; it must exercise more than mere good faith. It is a pro-
fessional which advertises by all media of mass communication its skill
in the investigation, settlement, and litigation of liability. It asks the
individual who is an amateur in these matters, but who would be deeply
concerned over a case in which he is personally interested, to substitute
its skill for its judgement for his judgement and its conduct for his own
acts. It then becomes chargeable with a greater duty even as a brain
surgeon must exercise greater knowledge, judgement, and skill in a
brain operation than would a general practitioner of medicine.29
While Appleman is referring to the defense of the insured at the litigation stage,
the pre-trial negotiation stage is also important to the defense of the insured, and
the courts should require equally skillful handling at that stage.
There are other reasons which demonstrate that the action should be brought
in tort. It is common knowledge that because of the backlog in most court sys-
tems, settlement of cases that can be resolved without a trial is desired. A higher
standard of care under a negligence theory, if imposed on an insurer, could lead
to a more careful evaluation of a case before taking it to trial, and thus force a
settlement. Applying the shorter statute of limitations of two years for a tort
actions9 in Illinois would encourage the insured to bring his action while insur-
28 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965).
29 7A Appleman Ins. L & P. § 4687 (1962).
80 11L. Rev. Stat. ch. 83 § 16 (1969).
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ance personnel, witnesses, and attorneys were still available, instead of allowing
the ten year limitation for an action on the contract."'
RIcHARD TRAvis
81 M11. Rev. Stat. ch. 83 § 17 (1969).
